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LANDSCAPE AND LAND PROPERTY RIGHT 
 
François Facchini 
 
ABSTRACT: This article shows how individuals privatise the landscape.  It reminds us that landscape 
was invented by art, and painting in particular. (1). An elite modified the outlook on nature.  It made 
landscape of the countryside.  Once individuals give aesthetic value to land, they buy not only the 
property rights to plant seed or build, but also to look. The demand for landscape thus leads to a 
supply of development in order to look at it.  This means producing viewing points (2) controlling their 
extension (3) and protecting image rights on property. 
 
Keywords: land, property right, public good and property right 
JEL: H41, H42 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The definition of landscape used in this article is that of the dictionary.  The landscape is a part of the 
countryside that nature presents to an observer (Nouveau Petit Le Robert). Faced with landscape; 
economics can be sceptical (Price 1978, p1). The landscape has no price.  It is not exchanged on a 
market.  It is not possible to speak of quantity of landscape.  It seems then to escape from economical 
analysis and its categories.  However to affirm that there is no means of treating non-commercial 
goods would be to be ignorant of economic theory.  Hedonist price methods, transportation costs and 
contingent evaluations suggest giving a price to goods that do not have one in order to integrate them 
into the economic calculation.  It is in this direction that most work devoted to landscape is undertaken.  
This type of approach permits a better understanding of individual resources committed in order to 
consume the landscape, but leaves in shadow most of the strategies invented by entrepreneurs to 
seize the profits born with the invention of landscape.   
 
This article tries to bridge the gap.  It maintains that the integration of the invention of landscape is 
explained by three economic calculations of the agents involved and in fine its management in 
exchanging property rights.  The invention of landscape illustrates the value that men bestow it and 
the means undertaken to consume it in a more or less exclusive manner.  By transforming a grove into 
landscape for example, the individual attributes an aesthetic value to the land and neglects its 
agricultural value.  The invention of landscape thus goes hand in hand with the discovery of the 
aesthetic dimension of the ground.  It is assimilated to a change in taste, an opportunity.   This article 
describes the manner in which the market seizes the change and serves a demand which emerged 
from the landscape.  It shows, firstly, that it is because art forms the taste for landscape that 
individuals are ready to allocate rare resources to consume and appropriate it.  Landscape economics 
logically follow its invention.  It is because the countryside has value as landscape that it creates 
entrepreneur strategies, their principle function being to serve the consumer. It then describes three 
specific strategies for appropriating landscape: purchase from a permanent point of view, purchase of 
rights on the extension, and the purchase of rights to the image of the property or natural monument. 
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1 The invention of landscape and its economical consequences  
 
As Anne Cauquelin illustrates in her book L’invention du paysage, the concept of landscape is recent 
and not evident.  There was, at the dawning of the renaissance, the invention of landscape because 
perspective in painting was developed.  After this, literature discovered the mountain and river banks 
in poems, meditations and tales of voyages.  Art thus transformed the evil and horrible mountain into a 
beautiful monument that one comes to admire and appreciate like a work of art in a museum.  Art 
invents landscape and transforms the way in which men see the world. It made nature a place of 
aesthetic experience.  Landscape is beautiful or ugly.  It is no longer a place for living or working.  
1930 French law on the patrimony protection translates this transformation of gaze by making 
landscape a natural monument of aesthetic value.  Art and nature become equivalent (Cauquelin 
1989, p.32). Art then transforms nature when landscapers and garden art come to put the space into 
perspective.  This gives it the aspect dreamed of by the artist. The painter produces a model; the 
demiurge gardener in his turn produces a reality which will be a model for the landscape painter 
(Cauquelin 1989, p.84). The story of landscape is thus the story of deluxe goods invented by the elite 
and which is progressively consumed by crowds of consumers who hurry to the beaches and 
mountainsides.  
 
By inventing landscape the elite created the conditions for emergence of a market for the greater 
number.  It is, for this reason, not correct to treat landscape as goods outside of a market even if it 
seems impossible to exchange landscape.  What counts for economic analysis is that men give it 
value.  This means that they are ready to pay, to mobilise resources to obtain it.  Landscape 
economics is born with the value of the countryside.  It can spot entrepreneurs’ strategies to respond 
to this demand and sometimes to create it.   
 
The entrepreneur is defined here as he who is more prompt than the crowd to identify an opportunity 
not exploited by market agents.  An opportunity for profit has several origins which can be classified 
into three categories: the type of exchange, the sources of opportunity themselves and the initiator of 
change (Eckhardt and Shane 2003, p.340). The type of change comes back to the question of  
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knowing whether it concerns a change created by the invention of new goods and services, new 
geographical selling areas, new production methods, new ways of organising the firm and/or the 
discovery of new raw materials.  Opportunities also vary according to their origin.  They are born from 
asymmetry of information, exogenous shocks such as political decisions, and demographic evolution 
due to scientific discoveries.  Opportunities are born from change in supply and demand conditions: 
tastes, culture, perception or new desires.  
 
The invention of landscape creates a new way of seeing.  It modifies the demand for space.  It 
changes the ground’s value.  The mountain, the beach, the desert and the shores now have an 
aesthetic value which leads individuals to mobilise resources to see them.   They are ready to pay to 
see these natural monuments as they are ready to pay to see a painting in a museum or an 
architectural monument.  The entrance fee is not a ticket, but the amount of resources used to situate 
oneself.  The individual commits resources to move and reside.  Landscape economics and natural 
resources suggest estimating the amount of resources committed by individuals to consume the 
landscape.  The evaluation of transportation costs and their evolution provides an initial indication of 
the value of landscape and the level of demand.  The number of visits reflects the demand.  The cost 
informs us about the intensity of this (Clawson and Knesth 1966). The landscape is for this reason a 
collective local commodity.  Space prevents individuals from consuming it.  The evaluation of 
residence costs and their evolution provides a second indication of the value of the landscape and the 
level of demand.  Hedonist price methods allow measurement of individuals’ willingness to pay.  They 
measure the quality of the landscape based on real estate price differences.  A certain number of 
articles make reference to this effect of landscape on prices.  The proximity of green spaces (Parent 
1969), the quality of nature (Weichart 1983), air pollution (Gordon and Richardson 1983), access to 
and view of the sea (Parsons et Wu 1991) are important elements when choosing a new lodging and 
these are the most valuable properties.  The individual really integrates the quality of landscape into 
his demand for lodging.  The quality of landscape can, for this reason, be defined as an environmental 
attribute of real estate. The price of the ground also depends upon the value of the view acquired.  
Lovers of the sea or of Mont St Michel are ready to pay more for land which provides this landscape.  
The quality of the view has a price on the real estate market (land and lodgings).  
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The invention of landscape not only creates profit opportunities for travel agencies and property 
owners.  It also leads entrepreneurs to invent services capable of making the most appreciated 
landscape exclusive.  Three types of service can be offered:  developing viewing points (2) developing 
the space and the structure of property to assure the quality of what one sees (3) and (4) ensuring 
ownership of the image of these goods to make land investment profitable.   
 
2 Exclusivity by purchasing a viewing point  
 
The appropriation of a viewing point is the essential means of access to landscape.  The current 
definition of landscape reminds us of this.  The landscape is a part of the countryside which nature 
presents to the observer.  It is a landscape observed from a viewing point. The viewing point is a 
necessary condition but is not sufficient to make landscape.  The entrepreneur develops to allow it to 
be seen.  Following the theory of substantive rationale, it is possible then to suppose that he will 
maximise his profit by optimising the number of viewing points in a given zone. He will offer viewing 
points in order to seize the value of the landscape.  A simple maximisation program allows the 
description of his objective function.  The entrepreneur perceives a source of monetary profit in selling 
viewing points.  He then proceeds with a maximisation calculation for profit under constraint  
 
Maximising profits and producing viewing points  
 
Max   under technical constraint Y = f ( S, W)  
 
with   the profit, Y the number of viewing points, S the surface area of the zone to be seen and W the 
different quantities of work and capital used for building to materialise the viewing points  
 
The profit corresponds to the price of viewing points by their number minus the costs, in other words, 
the price of the land (Ps) by the surface area (S) plus the price of input (Pw) by the quantities w  
 
(1)  Max Py.Y – (Ps.S + Pw.W) = Py . f ( S, W) – (Ps.S +Pw.W) 
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Optimum is reached for the quantities S and W which verifies the following conditions:  
 
 
  /   S = 0 et     /   W = 0, in other words, Py. f’s = Ps et Py.f’W= Pw .  
Which means (2) f’s/f’w=Ps/Pw with f’s=    Y/   S et f’w=    Y /   W. 
 
The marginal technical substitution rate (TMST = f’s/f’w) measures the supplementary ground which 
compensates for the reduction in the input quantity, the number of viewing points remaining 
unchanged.  It measures arbitration between juxtaposed viewing points (width) and viewing points 
stacked (height).  The price relation between the ground price and the input price (Ps/Pw) measures 
the rate at which the producer of viewing points can substitute the ground for input while keeping his 
costs fixed.   
 
Respecting the equilibrium of the equation (2) the producer of viewing points minimises his costs and 
maximises his profit by adopting an optimal productive combination knowing the price of the factors 
and their margin of productivity.  He equalises that which he gains by using a supplementary unit 
factor to that which it costs him.  The equilibrium in value is written: (3) f’s/Ps = f’w/Pw when the 
optimal combination is reached, the number of viewing points by level of spending is identical for each 
factor.  If the producer of viewing points respects this equilibrium, he obtains the greatest number of 
viewing points for a given level of spending (optimum).  The entrepreneur tries to discover the site’s 
optimal disposition of viewing points.  The first entry is located on the site and then each new arrival is 
situated in relation to those already on the site.  In this way the entrepreneur allows a maximum of 
individuals to buy a viewing point.  He develops to allow viewing.  He organises the consumption of the 
panorama.  .  
 
This equilibrium varies with the values of Ps and Pw.  If Ps increases as compared to Pw, there is a 
substitution of input to the ground factor and a tendency towards increased construction becomes 
necessary (profit constant). The entrepreneur superposes the viewing points in order to maximise the 
number.  Buildings go up and the monopoly power of the viewing zone owner (ground) increases.  The 
entrepreneur looks for higher-performance production techniques.  In other words, the means to build 
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even higher buildings.  The bay of Rio de Janeiro perfectly illustrates this logic - build ever higher to 
maximise the number of viewing points of the sea.  If Ps decreases as compared to Pw, there is 
substitution of the ground factor input, the height of construction decreases.  The price factor 
variations are thus responsible for the type of construction.  
 
The consequences of public policy on management of viewing points  
 
Any protection policy aimed at rationing, meaning decreasing the surface of the viewing zone (S) has, 
as far as this model is concerned, three effects. 1) It will accelerate the exhaustion of stock of viewing 
points which remain exploitable in the zone. Then it increases the density of viewing points in the 
unprotected zone. This means that constructions will be higher. 2) It increases the entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to pay to obtain a supplementary unit in the viewing zone. (S). Corruption and 
misappropriation of protection laws on the site and landscape is explained by the level of profit 
identified by the promoters, in other words, consumer pressure. A ban on construction in a coastal 
zone, to protect the shores, consequently prevents a large number of individuals from buying a 
viewing point and consuming the landscape.  3) Thus it creates artificial monopoly situations for those 
who have already entered. If the first arrivals are elite, in other words those who were the first to 
appreciate the landscape, they are ready to sacrifice the increased land value they could obtain by 
selling to a promoter in order to keep partial exclusivity of their landscape. They negotiate free access 
in exchange for a ban on density of the number of viewing points. The ban on sale to promoters 
penalises the consumer and the owners who wish to profit from the value attached to their viewing 
point. It penalises the consumers because they are prevented from accessing the landscape as they 
cannot buy a viewing point. Instead of maximising the number of viewing points on a site, the 
regulation institutes a status-quo.  It prevents any new entry to the site.  It freezes the positions 
obtained and inducts a price increase for the existing viewing points.  The owners win on both sides, 
they protect part of their exclusivity of the panorama and they give themselves the opportunity to take 
advantage of added value of their land if they finally decide to leave.  The consumers on the other 
hand are obliged, in order to buy a viewing point, to put up with the effect of rarity. This excludes low 
revenues.  The poor will consume the landscape, but temporarily.  They can see (mass tourism) but 
not move in.  They admire the houses at the seaside of the high revenues. 
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3 Exclusivity by purchasing the whole area  
 
The purchase of a zone or a viewing point, and moving about on this zone, only provides partial 
exclusivity for landscape consumption.  An event written about in a French daily which occurred in 
Normandy, in Calvados, leads even to thinking that the lack of exclusivity can create conflict.  
 
« The Boulevard Aristide Briand in Ouistreham (Calvados). On one side the beach, on the other, villas 
with an impressive view of the sea.  However, between the two, camping cars appeared.  The 
inhabitants were very upset.  Their panorama had clouded over.  About 70 of them, inhabitants of 
Ouistreham, sent a petition to the prefect to protest about the camping cars.  (D. Gourin, Ouest-
France, 17 Août 1990, p.16).  
 
This event illustrates two ways of consuming landscape: the window of the house which is a fixed 
viewing point and the window of the camping car which is a mobile viewing point.  The mobile viewing 
point introduces the dynamic of mobility. The fixed viewing point introduces permanence.  It also 
allows interrogation about the reasons for the partial exclusivity of landscape.  If the villas at the 
seaside are disturbed by the arrival of camping cars it is because they could come to the sea.  This 
free access is not a necessity.  In the absence of a national policy on roads and paths, it would be 
possible for the owners to organise and charge for access to their panorama, just like the owner of a 
museum, theatre or castle. Free access would be a choice if the roads and paths could be 
appropriated privately.  
 
The theory on incomplete property rights permits outlining reasons which would push a entrepreneur, 
who has the right, to reinforce the exclusivity of his property to prevent free access.  The right to 
property is always incomplete because it is never totally protected.  (Barzel 1989). The entrepreneur 
arbitrates between profits and costs of exclusivity.  His calculation evolves in function of profit 
opportunities present on the market and exclusion techniques.  The barbed wire is often cited as a 
technical intervention which profoundly changed agricultural production techniques in the United 
States.  It made exclusivity of land rights less expensive, and incited breeders to go from extensive  
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techniques to intensive techniques. In the case of landscape, it is mainly the evolution of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for landscape which explains the investment in site access protection. The Bay of 
Mont Saint Michel in France remains in free access; in these conditions, only if the owners of the land 
who permit access to it feel that the profits of exclusivity are inferior to its costs, otherwise stated, to 
the amount of resources they would have to invest to make the Bay profitable. The landscape is not, in 
this sense, a local collective property by necessity but by choice. It is the law which limits the 
possibilities to exclude those who do not pay to access it. 
 
At the end of the day, this element leads us to interrogate ourselves about the reasons for obstruction, 
the first being free access; in other words, the fact that villa owners did not protect access to the sea.  
The structure of rights influences individual strategies.  The impossibility of appropriating public roads 
and paths makes total exclusivity of landscape impossible. The second reason for obstruction is the 
purchase of a zone with a viewpoint does not render the landscape completely exclusive.  A viewing 
point is exclusive in the sense that its owner is the only one able to see the sea from that point, but 
that point does not exclude the existence of others. For one individual to benefit from the view of the 
sea at Ouistreham or the Bay of Mont Saint Michel, he would need to buy the whole viewing zone as 
well as the zone to be seen, or the total surface of the zone which enables viewing. He needs to be in 
a position of monopoly.  The appropriation of the landscape is complete and prevents conflicts if the 
individual possesses private property rights on the whole zone; the zone to be seen and the viewing 
points. Conflict between villa owners (fixed viewing points) and camping car owners is explained by 
the absence of controls of the zone viewed and/or its surroundings. It is because they do not attribute 
sufficient value to the exclusivity of the landscape, or that they don’t have the right to prohibit access to 
the beach that conflicts arise. Exclusivity in this sense does not affect only the way in which individuals 
access the landscape.  It also has an effect on their level of satisfaction.  It is because the landscape 
is not totally exclusive that it can be degraded. It is the absence of exclusivity which explains that 
individuals do not correctly control the evolution of their panorama.   
 
This does not permit, however, to affirm that in the presence of a conflict between industrial properties 
and the aesthetics of landscape, that it is up to the State to impose aesthetic priorities. In the light of  
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what has been said, this suggestion is not correct.  State intervention would only, on the one hand, 
prevent people from expressing their consent to pay, and on the other hand would officially attribute a 
value to the landscape. If industrial development destroys the aesthetic qualities of a zone, it is simply 
because the individuals grant more value to industrial property than to landscape.  
 
This does not lead either to the same conclusions as Coase (1960).  He upholds that if the judge had 
cancelled the building permit of a landowner who blocked the surrounding houses’ view, he would 
have prohibited the formation of cities, and then the whole of the collectivity would have to support 
high cost in preventing the formation of an agglomerate economy.  It is because the judge is guarantor 
of the efficiency of decisions that he did not decide in favour of the complainant.  The argumentation 
developed here is different, and does not pave the way either for public intervention or for the arbitrary 
legal decision whose objective would be to mimic the market.  It is based on a simple principle. 
Purchase of property rights is the best way to control the evolution of the countryside. An individual 
whose view has been obstructed by someone else simply has no rights, as he has not consented to 
allocate resources to protect his view.  Beginning from the concept that landscape can be 
appropriated, it is no longer necessary to have recourse to hypothetical criteria, which is more or less 
arbitrary efficiency, to explain the judge’s decision. It suffices to uphold that the judge’s function is to 
ensure that owners’ rights are respected. If they haven’t committed resources to ensure the evolution 
of their panorama, they are responsible. They considered that it wasn’t worth it, otherwise stated, that 
the value of the landscape was insufficient to compensate the costs of its protection, exclusivity. 
 
The main economic strategy to ensure the quality of what we see is then the purchase of the 
countryside.  The landscape channels exploit this demand. It maintains and creates spaces for land 
owners who are concerned with developing, in making their living space attractive and agreeable.  The 
attraction for all natural zones susceptible to creating a monopoly is explained by this logic of 
countryside control by the purchase of the area. Seaside, lakeside and riverside, as well as 
panoramas in dominant locations or on mountainsides, guarantee to their owners a relative certainty 
about the aesthetic quality of their view. 
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4 Exclusivity by image right protection 
 
The ownership of a viewing point (zone to see from) and the area (zone to be seen) is not always 
sufficient, however, to render the landscape completely exclusive.  It is in fact possible to arrive at the 
place by air and photograph or film the area.  The sale of pictures and films to editors and movie 
theatres and all kinds of Medias obviously renders exclusivity obsolete.  Henceforth everyone can see 
the beauty of the landscape on paper or on television.  This example could, at first glance, appear to 
be no realistic, it was however an important current event in France when a lawsuit, now closed by a 
decree of the Supreme Court in May 2001 (Ravanas 2002), awarded in favour of the photographers 
against the land owners.  
 
Debates surrounding image rights of land in French jurisprudence  
 
At the origin of the conflict there was a lawsuit between the Dubray publishing company, which sold 
postcards of a café, Gondrée, owned by Madame Gondrée, which had been in 1944, the first house 
liberated by the Allied Forces in Normandy after the landing.  A first decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Caen decided in favour of the publishing company, but a second decision of the Supreme Court 
annulled the Court of Appeals ruling and scrupulously upheld the absolute rights over images of one’s 
land. The Supreme Court considered that the sale of postcards violated Article 544 of the Civil Code 
as the editor exploited the property in the form of photographs and thus infringed on the owner’s rights 
to enjoyment of his property.  Article 544 of French Civil Code stipulates that “the owner has sole right 
to the exploitation of his property, in whatever form. » therefore « the exploitation of a building in the 
form of photography infringes upon the owner’s rights to enjoy his property” This decision was in 
favour of the owners and authorised Mrs Gondrée to refuse that a third party use the image of the 
building for commercial ends without her authorisation.  The Supreme Court, in 1999, decreed then in 
favour of an exclusive and absolute power of the owner who could oppose the reproduction of the 
image of his property and conserve its marketable value.  The owner of property over which no 
intellectual property is exercised disposes then of an absolute right to the image of his property and is 
the only one who can decide about the eventual commercial exploitation of its image. If we keep to this  
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decision, the law protects the exclusivity of the owner’s property image rights.  He controls both the 
evolution of his viewing point, by having property rights over the whole and the image of his property.  
 
Other lawsuits following this decision questioned the result.   The most symbolic is the conflict 
between the co-owners of Puy Pariou, in the Puy de Dome –vs- the distribution group, Casino Géant.   
In May 1999, a photo Tec (SDP) sold, by the intermediary of his local representative, the rights to an 
aerial photograph of the regional park of volcanoes of Auvergne in France, wherein Puy de Dome and 
the Puy Pariou appeared.  The silent partner, the group Géant-Casino, used this photo to extol the 
virtues of their agricultural products.  In the foreground of this photograph is the crater of the volcano 
Puys de Pariou.  Following this publicity campaign, the volcano’s ownership associations demanded 
that the group Géant-Casino pay damages linked to the prejudice suffered by the owners (the amount 
was 120.000 French francs).  The group Géant-Casino refused to pay and was thus summoned to the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance (court of first instance of general jurisdiction).  The land owners of Puy 
Pariou have taken him to court for not having asked their permission.  Juridical history this time does 
not decide in favour of the owners. The tribunal de Grande Instance de Clermont-Ferrand, on 23 
January 2002, inspired by a Supreme Court decision, considered that if there is no prejudice it is not 
possible to claim damages.  The owners of Puy Pariou are disgusted because they did not prove that 
the reproduction of the image of their property had definitely caused a certain disturbance of their 
rights to use and enjoy.  In this case, the property owner remains owner of the image only if the use of 
this image by a third party causes abnormal disturbance. Property image rights are no longer 
exclusive but linked to damage evaluated by the judge.  Image rights are henceforth decided by the 
judge. 
  
The consequences of this debate for the analysis of the process of privatisation of landscape  
 
The value of these conflicts is multiple. Firstly, they ask the question: to whom should the image rights 
belong? The owners or photographers?  This question is rich in economical consequence but is 
beyond the subject of this article.   . Then they bring to light the existence of a new form of protecting 
property rights; the law.  Exclusivity is not only obtained by owners’ decisions.  Jurisprudence is also  
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concerned.   In the same way, as free access can be imposed by the law which prohibits privatisation 
of roads and paths, jurisprudence can impose the non-exclusivity of the image of property.  A change 
in the jurisprudence can transit by a legislative measure, otherwise stated, a political action aimed at 
applying pressure on Parliament.  They show, lastly, that the production of an image is a means, 
amongst others, to exploit the beauty of a natural monument.  The demand for landscape is no longer 
satisfied only by travel or the purchase of a viewing point.  It is fulfilled by the image.   The landscape 
as an image is thus not without an owner.  It belongs to either the landowner or the photographer.  In 
both cases the image of natural monuments, sites and landscape, is exclusive.  It is not free property. 
It can be sold and give rise to an exchange for mutual gain. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The invention of landscape has thus created a modification in the hierarchy of land prices and 
behaviour patterns. The shoreline, the mountain, wet zones, and green spaces in the broad sense, 
have become valuable.  Individuals no longer perceive the earth as a means of production.  They have 
made it the support for an aesthetic service.  The ground and its characteristics are the same, but the 
way of perceiving them has changed.  The increase in revenues, and the appearance of a middle 
class, has generalised this taste for nature, the sea and the mountain, and transforms landscape from 
deluxe goods, reserved for the elite, to normal ones, accessible to middle class who, thanks to the 
decrease in transport costs and the increase in their revenues, have access to this type of 
consumption. Owners of the most sought after viewing zones, as well as the promoters, have thus 
been able to perceive in this evolution, the existence of opportunities for profit. They have launched 
into a policy of development to see better.  It is no longer the individual step of a few elite who come to 
admire the mountain or nature, but an industrial or real estate approach. The entrepreneurs 
recognised in this desire for landscape the possibility to make exclusive profit. They sold viewing 
points, purchased extensive properties, coined the images, and thus responded to the demand for 
landscape of a large mass of people. They made accessible to the greater number, landscape judged 
to be most sought after, by developing to allow seeing. They made aesthetic wealth available in order 
to make a profit and respond to the demand.  
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This dynamic of profit exploitation, linked to the value assigned to a certain panorama, leads to two 
types of conclusions.  It is not right, first of all, to enclose the landscape economy in the category of 
non merchant goods, and more specifically, collective goods.  Landscape is something that can be 
appropriated, and privately.  It is possible then to create a demand for landscape and invent a new 
way of seeing the countryside. Nature has progressively become landscape for which men are ready 
to invest part of their resources.  It is possible that industrial buildings, electrical pylons, windmills, and 
seasides render aesthetic services because artists perceived their beauty by immortalising them in a 
photograph,, a painting, a novel, or a poem.  The aesthetic value men attribute to their country is not 
immutable.  It evolves.  This leads to upholding that it is not desirable to think up rigid public policies in 
matters of landscape, and that the principle source of protection must be the amount of resources men 
allocate to see, and not that they have hypothetically consented to pay to protect a landscape at the 
time of a questionnaire of no consequence.  
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